shall enable him to purchase a home of a specified value, and authorizing it to be expended in such purchase only; or a statute requiring the wage earner to make no contracts involving the expenditure of his wages without advising with an approved adviser, one of those persons belonging to some other than the wage earning class, all of whom are assumed to be capable of making contracts generally, with prudence and profit to themselves? In the language of Judge Cooley, the regulations made for any one class of citizens "restricting their rights, privileges, or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, must rest upon some reason upon which they can be defended—like the want of capacity in infants and insane persons. If the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some specified lawful trade, or employment, should not have the capacity to make contracts, ... or in any other way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due bounds of legislative power."

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EQUALITY OF PROTECTION.—Another Indiana case,—*Parks* v. *State* (1902), — Ind. — , 64 N. E. Rep. 862,—sustains the validity of a statute regulating the practice of medicine and surgery and involves another interesting illustration of the pervading character of the police power and an illustration of classification for purposes of regulation indicating a liberal view of the constitutional guaranty of equal protection. The statute provided that it should not apply "to any physician or surgeon who is legally qualified to practice in the state or territory in which he resides when in actual consultation with a legal practitioner of this state, nor to any physician or surgeon residing on the border of the state and duly authorized to practice under the laws thereof whose practice extends into the limits of this state. *Provided*, that such practitioner shall not open an office or appoint a place to meet patients or receive calls within the limits of this state." Here is the statute of a state saying to its own citizens "you must submit to a particular inquisition to determine your qualifications for the practice of medicine and have the acknowledgment of the state that you have done so, and its certificate that you possess the required qualifications, and the fact that you are qualified under the law of a sister state and produce the proper evidence of it shall not exempt you from these requirements," while it is saying to the resident of that sister state, "you are at liberty to practice your profession in this state if you can do it at home and are exempt from these obligations laid upon our own citizens, particularly if you happen to reside 'along our borders.'" Is not a classification which makes the determination of the right of a person to pursue a particular calling depend alone upon the accident of whether he resides upon one side or the other of a particular boundary line quite unreasonable? And would it not seem more objectionable in the state to so discriminate against its own citizens with whose care, protection and general welfare it is particularly charged? No distinction can be made between aliens and citizens in regard to occupations which may be carried on of common right. *State* v. *Montgomery*, 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165. Without attempting to call specific attention to the great number of cases bearing upon this question of equality of protection, reference is made to another case in the same court involving this principle and to the cases cited in the opinion in that case. *Dixon* v. *Poe*, — Ind. — , 65 N. E. 578, decided Nov. 25, 1902.